Everyone said this would happen: 50 years of warnings that Iran would close Hormuz and that bombs alone could not end its program

People and organizations

Donald Trump, Pete Hegseth, US military (Department of Defense), Government of Iran, Congressional Research Service, Trump administration

Places

United States, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia

Evidence label

Reporting — Original reporting by an identified news organization that we opened and dated. Investigative findings are attributed to the outlet, not asserted as adjudicated fact. More

What happened

None of what the Iran war produced was a surprise to anyone who had read the literature, starting with a bipartisan 2012 study that laid out the costs in advance [1].

The strait. Iran's capacity and willingness to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world's oil moves, has been on the record since the Shah said in 1972 that Iran could close it [3]. Iran threatened closure during the Iran-Iraq war in 1983 and 1984, bought Kilo-class submarines in the 1990s with the stated mission of controlling the strait, threatened it again over sanctions in 2011 and 2018, and in March 2012 the threats alone pushed Brent above $126 [3][7]. A 2012 Israeli assessment catalogued Iran's fast boats, midget submarines and more than 1,000 missiles, laid out the mining-and-attack scenario, estimated two weeks to two months for the US to reopen the strait, and named Saudi installations within 300 km as targets [4]. In August 2025, seven months before the war, the Congressional Research Service told Congress the strait carried 27 percent of maritime oil trade, that bypass pipelines could handle only 2.6 million of its 20 million daily barrels, that more than 90 percent of the world's spare production capacity sat inside the Gulf, that Iran held about 6,000 mines, and that restoring shipping after a closure "could take days, weeks, or months" [5]. In June 2025, Barclays warned the risk was not priced in and UBS said Brent could exceed $120 if the strait closed [6].

The bombs. In September 2012, a group of former senior US officials and national security professionals published a bipartisan study of military action against Iran. Its judgments: US strikes could set Iran's program back "up to four years"; guaranteeing Iran never gets a bomb would require "an expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period" and likely an occupation costing more than Iraq and Afghanistan combined; strikes would not produce regime change or capitulation; Iran would retaliate, "might try to close the Strait of Hormuz, raising oil prices," and could widen the war through Hezbollah; and military action could increase Iran's motivation to build a bomb [1][2]. After the June 2025 strikes, a leaked preliminary Defense Intelligence Agency assessment estimated a delay of fewer than six months, found the entrances to two sites sealed without the underground buildings collapsing, and European assessments said the enriched stockpile was largely intact; the administration's response was to call the assessment wrong and move to limit intelligence sharing with Congress [8].

Why it matters

Measured against those warnings, the 2026 war did what they said it would. Iran's response "effectively shut" the strait; nearly all tanker traffic stopped and major producers cut output [10][7]. US intelligence assessed in May that Iran retained about 70 percent of its missile stockpile and launchers and that its nuclear capacity was "broadly unchanged" from the previous summer [10]. By September, Iran had resumed missile production underground, the IAEA had not verified anything on-site for six months, construction had surged at the suspected Pickaxe Mountain site, the regime was more entrenched with 6,500 arrested and executions surging, Iran's Houthi allies controlled the Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz traffic was about one-fifth of prewar levels, and Brent was $104 against $72 before the war [11][10]. Foreign Policy's headline on September 17: "By nearly every metric, the U.S. is losing the Iran war." Eurasia Group's Gregory Brew said the United States had failed its main strategic goals as it had stated them [11]. The Stimson Center's conclusion in May was the same: the war did not achieve its stated objectives and imposed substantial military, economic and strategic costs [10].

The Washington Institute, a week into the war, had already identified the pattern: officials would not say how many missiles Iran retained, strikes alone could not remove enriched uranium or verify other sites, US efforts to reopen shipping had "achieved little," and Washington had failed to plan for contingencies or even warn its own citizens [9].

The evidence

• The Iran Project's 2012 executive summary and the Baker Institute's description of its signatories [1][2].
• The New Arab's and the AP's histories of Hormuz threats, with dates and oil-price effects [3][7].
• The INSS 2012 assessment of Iran's capabilities and reopening timelines [4].
• CRS's August 2025 pre-war report to Congress [5].
• CNBC's June 2025 survey of bank forecasts [6].
• Just Security on the 2025 DIA assessment and the administration's reaction [8].
• The Washington Institute, Stimson and Foreign Policy assessments of the war at one week, three months and seven months [9][10][11].

Response and counterpoints

Not every warning pointed one way. The 2012 INSS authors doubted Iran could block the strait "hermetically" for long and judged a blockade not in Iran's interest, and in June 2025 Goldman Sachs and UBS thought closure unlikely for the same reason [4][6]. Iran did not close the strait during the 12-day war of June 2025 [7][5]. The administration points to real military results: 161 Iranian naval vessels destroyed, 90 percent of mines, the death of Ali Khamenei [10]. The 2012 report itself was framed as non-advocacy and its signatories did not endorse every point [1].

What remains uncertain

Intelligence estimates of Iran's remaining missiles, launchers and enriched uranium are reported, not published, and vary by source [10][11]. The Iran Project's 2012 estimates concerned a different Iranian program and different US capabilities; the parallel is in the structure of the problem, not the numbers. Whether the current economic-pressure campaign changes the outcome is open [11].

Money and method

The oil-price figures are Brent benchmarks as reported in the cited articles [7][11]. The Stimson cost figures ($29 billion by May 12; 13 dead and 380 wounded) are earlier snapshots than those in the companion Iran war story, which carries the September and October totals [10].

Sources cited

1. [1]
   Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran (executive summary) — The Iran Project, hosted by the Wilson Center, 2012-09-11.

   supports · Highlights and Executive Summary sections I-III (2012 report signed by former senior officials: US strikes could set Iran's program back 'up to four years'; ensuring Iran never gets a bomb would require 'an expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period' and likely occupation requiring more resources than Iraq and Afghanistan combined; strikes would not lead to regime change or capitulation; Iran would retaliate, 'might try to close the Strait of Hormuz, raising oil prices'; proxies including Hezbollah could widen the war; military action could increase Iran's motivation to build a bomb) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-01
2. [2]
   Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran — Rice University's Baker Institute, 2012-09-20.

   context · Paragraph 1 (signatories are former US government officials and national security professionals; Edward Djerejian among them; published by The Iran Project) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-02
3. [3]
   A history of Iranian threats to blockade Gulf oil exports — The New Arab, 2018-12-13.

   supports · Paragraphs 1, 13, 34, 46-56, 68-73, 86-89 (one-fifth of world oil transits Hormuz; the Shah said Iran could close it in 1972; threats during the Iran-Iraq war in 1983 and 1984 with Reagan's response; Kilo submarines bought in the 1990s with the stated mission of controlling Hormuz; 2011 Rahimi threat; 2018 Rouhani threat) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-03
4. [4]
   The Strait of Hormuz: Assessing and Neutralizing the Threat — Institute for National Security Studies, Strategic Assessment, 2012-01-01.

   supports · Introduction and 'The Iranian Threat' paragraphs 1-19 (2012 INSS assessment: Iran's Gulf posture of fast boats, midget submarines and more than 1,000 missiles; three scenarios including mining and attacking ships; estimates of two weeks to two months for the US to reopen the strait; Saudi installations within 300 km as targets; 1980s tanker war precedent); conclusion (Iran likely to keep threatening the strait) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-04
5. [5]
   Iran Conflict and the Strait of Hormuz: Oil and Gas Market Impacts (R45281) — Congressional Research Service via EveryCRSReport, 2025-08-04.

   supports · Summary and 'Oil' section (Aug. 2025 CRS report: Hormuz carried about 27% of maritime oil trade and 22% of LNG, about 20 million barrels a day; spare capacity more than 90% inside the Gulf; bypass pipelines only 2.6 million barrels a day); 'Iran's Perspective' (mines, missiles, vessels and deterrent threats; mine inventory about 6,000); 'U.S. Confidence' (restoring shipping 'could take days, weeks, or months,' especially if mines are laid; four minesweepers in Bahrain) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-05
6. [6]
   How high oil could go if Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz — CNBC, 2025-06-23.

   supports · Paragraphs 2-9 (June 23, 2025: Barclays says Hormuz risk not priced; Goldman: 50% traffic cut for a month could push Brent to $110; UBS: above $120 if closed; Danske Bank: mines or a sunk vessel could cause a long disruption and insurers would bar transit) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-06
7. [7]
   The Strait of Hormuz has been disrupted before. A look at past crises — Associated Press via San Francisco Chronicle, 2026-03-10.

   supports · Sections on 1980s tanker war, 2011-2012 (Brent above $126 in March 2012 on threats alone), 2018, 2019-2025 and June 2025 (Iran did not close the strait in the 12-day war); paragraphs 1-5 (in the 2026 war, attacks and threats halted nearly all tanker traffic and major producers cut output) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-07
8. [8]
   The Intelligence Implications of Iran and Operation Midnight Hammer — Just Security, 2025-06-27.

   supports · Paragraphs 1-3 and 'What We Know So Far' (June 2025: Hegseth defends 'obliterated' claim; leaked preliminary DIA assessment estimated a delay of fewer than six months and that entrances were sealed without collapsing underground buildings; European assessments: enriched stockpile largely intact); paragraphs 10-11 and 17-20 (no firm evidence program destroyed; administration moved to limit intelligence sharing with Congress; earlier firing of NIC officials over an assessment contradicting Trump) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-08
9. [9]
   Assessing U.S. Progress in the Iran War — The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2026-03-06.

   supports · Paragraphs 2-8 (March 6, 2026: four objectives; officials had not said how many missiles Iran retained; strikes alone likely cannot remove enriched uranium or verify other sites; shipping halted mainly by deterrent threats and US efforts to resume it 'achieved little'; Washington failed to plan for contingencies or warn US citizens; administration failed to explain the war's need and objectives) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-09
10. [10]
    Is the Iran War Worth It? — Stimson Center, 2026-05-20.

    supports · 'Grand Strategy' and 'U.S. Objectives' (multiple shifting rationales; Hegseth's four objectives excluded regime change); objective sections (US intelligence: Iran retained about 70% of missile stockpile and launchers; nuclear capacity 'broadly unchanged'; regime more entrenched; 6,500 arrested, executions surged); 'What Were the Costs' (13 US dead and 380 wounded by May; more than 1,700 Iranian civilians including about 250 children; $29 billion as of May 12; CSIS: three years to replenish munitions; gasoline from $2.98 to $4.49; conclusion: war did not achieve its objectives) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-10
11. [11]
    By Nearly Every Metric, the U.S. Is Losing the Iran War — Foreign Policy, 2026-09-17.

    supports · Paragraphs 5-7 and section headings (Sept. 17, 2026: 'strategic failure'; Eurasia Group's Gregory Brew: US failed its main stated goals; Houthis control Bab el-Mandeb; Iran resumed missile production underground; regime more entrenched; 440 kg stockpile location unknown; IAEA no on-site verification for six months; construction surge at Pickaxe Mountain; Hormuz traffic about one-fifth of prewar; Brent about $104 vs $72 before the war) · checked 2026-10-26 · source N-warn-11